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Streams and River-Beds




1 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s interest in the writings of William James characterizes the whole
of his philosophical work. We know from a letter to Bertrand Russell that as early as 1912
he was reading The Varieties of Religious Experience, a book that gave rise to his attraction
for mysticism,1 and that he later warmly recommended to his friend Maurice Drury. 2
After his return to philosophy, in his notebooks and typescripts he refers to James and
particularly to The Principles of Psychology (PP)3 from the beginning of the Thirties to the
end of his life.4 Furthermore, we know that he even thought of using it as a textbook for
his lessons in Cambridge, though according to some critics more as a set of examples of
the mistakes of  psychologists  than as  a  handbook in the usual  sense.5 Wittgenstein’s
interest in James’ psychology, far from diminishing, even increased in the last years of his
life,  and was at  its  greatest  after the Second World War:  the notes from his 1946-47
lectures collected by his students Peter Geach, Kanti Shah and A. C. Jackson6 are full of
explicit and implicit references to James, as well as the RPP (1946-48) and generally the
manuscripts of those years; besides, one should not forget the influence of James’ thought
on some relevant, though often neglected, concepts of the later Wittgenstein, such as
those of patterns of life,  the indeterminacy of psychological concepts,  the connection
between emotions and the expression of emotions.7
2 In spite of some early positive comments, notably not belonging to the Wittgensteinian
tradition,8 Wittgenstein’s  attitude towards  James  and towards  the PP has  often been
described by Wittgenstein’s scholars as merely critical and negative. Peter Hacker, for
example, mentions James may times in his extensive commentary on the PI, but usually
as a negative counterpart of Wittgenstein’s ideas, sometimes identifying him with one of
the  invisible  interlocutors  against  which  the  philosopher  battles  in  his  remarks.9
Regarding the stream of thought, Hacker depicts it as “philosophical confusion” and even
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bluntly affirms that it is “largely a meaningless babble.”10 But, as more recently stated by
some  other  commentators,11 Wittgenstein’s  attitude  should  be  better  described  as
twofold:  although  he  criticized  James  in  many  respects,  he  also  appreciated  James’
masterpiece, particularly for its richness of examples, its freshness, depth and also for the
“humanity” of its author.12
3 The PP chapter  on the stream of  thought  is  one of  the main objects  of  concern for
Wittgenstein. It is here that we find some examples that he often cited and criticized,
such as that of the “and-feeling,” the “if-feeling” and the like (PP: I, 245; cf. PI: part II, 155,
RPP: I, §§ 331, 334), the recalling of a forgotten name or meaning (PP: I, 251; RPP: I, §§ 174,
180), the feeling connected to the intention of saying something (PP: I, 253; RPP: II, §§
242-3, PI: part I, §§ 591, 633, part II, 155, 182), and the case of Mr. Ballard as showing the
possibility of there being thought without language (PP: I, 266, PI, part I: § 342).
4 Strangely enough,  James’  image of  the stream has only rarely13 been associated with
Wittgenstein’s use of the metaphor of the flux or of the river. The latter uses this image in
various periods and with various meanings. During the phenomenological years of the PR,
he speaks about the flux of experiences and of the vagueness of immediate experience:
here the theme is  connected to the question whether it  is  possible or not to have a
language of immediate experience. In these years Wittgenstein sometimes holds that it is
only in the flux of experience that any sentence can be verified, though it is constitutively
impossible for language to directly denote the elements of  the flux.14 The reading of
James’ PP may hold some responsibility for the emergence of this set of problems. When
Wittgenstein’s  interest  turns  from  the  phenomenological  language  to  the  ordinary
language, the image of the flux turns from the flux of experiences to the flux of life and
discourse. Again, it is probably James that Wittgenstein has in mind when he points out
that the meaning of any expression is not to be found in the flux of experiences but in the
context of the discourse and, more generally, in the context of life, with its linguistic
games and its  background of  know-how and culture.15 So,  as Steiner (2012) elegantly
surmises, what enables our understanding of psychological concepts and phenomena is
not  a  mental  immanence,  but  an  anthropological-normative  immanence:  a  logical-
grammatical context together with an anthropological background.16
5 What is still missing in the secondary literature, as far as I know, is a comparison between
James’ stream of thought and Wittgenstein’s river-bed of thoughts, which he describes in
OC  with  the  aim  of  distinguishing  between  logical  and  empirical  propositions. In
discussing the river-bed of thoughts Wittgenstein does not explicitly address James. But
the choice of the image and the words used to describe it can and do suggest such a
connection.  Is  it  possible  to  find in the Nachlass details  or  evidence pointing in this
direction?  Can  Wittgenstein’s  river-bed  be  read  –  among  other  things  –  as  a  direct
comment on James’  stream? As we shall  see,  the comparison and this conclusion are
legitimated by two remarks contained in Manuscripts 165 and 129.17
 
1. The Nachlass
6 The name “James” appears 90 times in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, from 193218 to 1950-51.19 In
particular,  considering  both  the  English  expression  “stream  of  thought”  and  its
equivalent in German “Gedankenstrom,” we can find four contexts in which Wittgenstein
makes use of James’ metaphor, some of which recur more than once.20
Streams and River-Beds
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
2
7 The first entry is in Item 120 (1937-38), a manuscript which is well-known because it
contains three drafts of the future preface of the PI. On February, 27th 1938 Wittgenstein
wrote  a  dozen  pages  in  the  manuscript,  and  it  is  here  that  we  find  the  word
“Gedankenstrom” in the context of a discussion concerning if and when a man can be said
to be wrong when speaking about a pain that he is feeling. In the case of something
suspending or changing the direction of  the man’s attention,  Wittgenstein says,  “the
stream of thought is interrupted, and we can only guess how it could have proceeded.”21
Here, it seems, the meaning of Gedankenstrom is not in question: Wittgenstein is using it
as a unproblematic concept, within the discussion of a peculiar language game. I shall call
this use of James’ expression “the unproblematic stream.”
8 The second occurrence is in Item 124, a manuscript volume containing remarks mostly
from  1944.  After  considering  the  problem  of  the  relation  between  expectation  and
fulfillment, and stressing the importance of the circumstances in which an expectation
takes place,  Wittgenstein writes:  “Here one could speak of  the stream of thought,  of
which James talks, and point out that, when a well-known name is mentioned to me, my
thoughts pour forth into a series of canals, and they continue to run in them, and that the
meaning of the name is revealed in these streams.”22 In the following lines there is a
critique to James: “He should tell  us what happens, while he only tells us what must
happen – Wittgenstein writes –. He wants to communicate an empirical fact, but he slips
and makes a metaphysical remark.” I shall call this occurrence ‘the slippery stream.’
9 The third entry can be found in Item 165, a pocket notebook with remarks dating back,
again, mostly to 1944 and often mentioned in relation to the debate on following a rule
and on the private language argument. Many of these remarks are crossed through by
vertical or diagonal lines, and this is also the case of the passage we are going to cite.
Since this remark will appear again, with some variations, in a slightly later and more
accurate manuscript with no deletions, it is also worth working on this version, which is
very explicit about James’ ‘mistake.’ In discussing the relation between expectation and
fulfillment, intention and meaning, Wittgenstein proposes an example:
I’m waiting for two people A and B. I say: “When will he come!” Someone asks me:
“Who do you mean?” I say, “I thought about A.” And these very words have built a
bridge. Or he asks “Who do you mean?” I say, “I thought about…” a poem in which
there is this sentence. I make these connections among what I say in the course of
my thoughts and actions. (This remark is in relation with what W. James calls “the
stream of  thought.”  The mistake in his  picture is  that  a  priori  and a posteriori
grammatical  and  experiential  are  not  distinguished.  So  he  speaks  about  the
continuity of the stream of thought and he compares it with that of spaces, not with
that of a sort of jet of water).23
10 The theme of expectation and fulfillment is often present in Wittgenstein’s writings; the
example with the expression “When will he come”! – without the explicit reference to
James’ stream of thought – recurs also in typescripts 211, 212, 213 of the beginning of the
Thirties, in various manuscripts of the Fourties and in Part I of the PI (§ 544).
11 The later manuscript which I mentioned is Item 129, a volume of the second half of 1944.
Correcting some previous misprints, Wittgenstein writes:
(I believe, that this remark is in relation with what W. James calls “the stream of
thought.” Even though he certainly does not distinguish a priori and a posteriori,
empirical and grammatical propositions).24
12 Again and with more clarity, Wittgenstein points out – although now without speaking of
a mistake – that James does not distinguish between a priori and a posteriori; and in this
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case he speaks of grammatical and empirical propositions. I shall call this occurrence, in
the two formulations of MS 165 and 129, “the stream with no banks.”
13 In the same MS 129, only a few pages after what we have just read, we find the next entry.
“One could say – writes Wittgenstein –: I would not have an impression of the room as a
whole, if I could not let my glance wonder here and there and myself move around freely.
(Stream of thought.) James.”25 And he continues: “But how does it show that I have an
impression of it as a whole? In the naturalness with which I find my way in it; in the
absence of querying, doubting and surprise; in the fact that within its walls innumerable
activities are encompassed; and in the fact that I sum up all this as ‘my room’ in the
speech.”  Here  the  stream  of  thought  seems  to  correspond  to  a  mentalist  way  of
conceiving what it is to know a certain meaning, a conception that Wittgenstein contrasts
by underlying the importance of actions and know-how. This last remark on the stream
of thought is repeated in Typescript 228 (1945-46), with no variations, and again, with
minor variations,  in Typescript 233a,  which was published as Zettel (in the published
edition we find it as § 203). I shall call this stream “the impressionist stream.”
14 Let us sum up. The first occurrence of the term seems, as we have seen, unproblematic:
Wittgenstein simply uses it in the context of the discussion of the meaning of internal
states such as pain and of the criterion of attributing truth or falsity to a man’s assertions
about his state. If meaning is to be found in the stream of thought, and the justification
for  a  true  assertion  too,  then the  interruption  of  the  stream of  thought  may  cause
problems in the identification of meaning and truth conditions. But is meaning to be
found in  the  stream of  thought?  This  question,  which is  probably  already implicitly
present in the “unproblematic stream,” is more explicitly addressed in what I have called
the “slippery” and the “impressionist” streams. In the first case, meaning is seen as the
streams and currents in which thought pours when a well-known name is mentioned. But
this characterization fails in its attempt to catch the empirical, experiential facts about
meaning,  and  becomes  metaphysical.  In  the  case  of  “the  impressionist  stream,”
Wittgenstein underlines the importance of  some physical  and active elements  in the
determination of meaning (here, the meaning of a room, identified with the impression of
the room as a whole). Instead of accepting a private approach which stresses the role of
sensory  impressions,  Wittgenstein  directs  the  attention  towards  the  practical,
behavioural and linguistic elements in which the possession of the meaning shows itself.
15 The “slippery” and the “impressionist” conceptions of the stream as the inner place of
meaning (and, maybe, also the seemingly unproblematic first version) are both criticized
by Wittgenstein for their commitment to a psychologistic, internalist idea of the mind
and  of  meaning  itself.  The  critique  is  addressed  not  only  to  James,26 but  also  to
Wittgenstein’s own phenomenological phase: the argument against a private language
can be read as an implicit critique of the attempt to find truth conditions in the flux of
experiences or of thought, as this flux is intrinsically private and can rely on no public
criteria of assertibility or justification.27 A private language is impossible because, if it is
language, then it is not private:28 this is part of the grammar of the word “language.”
Thus,  when  James  tries  to  explain  meaning  by  referring  to  the  stream  thought,  in
Wittgenstein’s view he misses the point. It is true that language and meaning belong to a
flux, but this is not the flux of thought: it is the flux of discourse and of life.29 So, its depth
and richness  notwithstanding,  James’  psychology  –  in  Wittgenstein’s  view –  remains
anchored to an introspective method which leads us astray (PI: §§ 411-14) and contributes
to the construction of the image of an internal realm, which is not so distant from the
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classic Cartesian image. Two aspects must be, anyway, underlined: that James himself
tried to abandon the Cartesian concept of consciousness (Myers 1986: 61), and that his
appeal to experimental techniques and physiological theories aimed at a methodological
pluralism  which  mitigated  the  importance  of  introspection.  Wittgenstein  evidently
thought  that  it  was  not  enough,  and  that  James’  perspective  was  an  example  of  a
discipline  torn  between  “experimental  methods  and  conceptual  confusion,”  as  he
famously stated in the final paragraph of the PI.30
16 The remaining two occurrences of the “stream with no banks” are the remarks to which I
would like to dedicate the next section of this paper, for two reasons: because they allow
us to inquire further into one of Wittgenstein’s critiques towards James, which has not
yet been analyzed in depth; and because it can be fruitfully connected to Wittgenstein’s
own image of the river-bed of thoughts.
 
2. MS 165 and 129 as an Anticipation of the Metaphor
of On Certainty
17 Let us take a closer look at these two remarks. MS 165 attributes a mistake to James: that
of not distinguishing between a priori, or grammatical, and a posteriori, or empirical.
Mixing together these two aspects, Wittgenstein explains, James is not actually speaking
of a stream or of a jet of water; it would be more appropriate to say that he is speaking of
spaces and of the continuity of spaces. It is not easy to understand why it should be so.
Perhaps,  we can argue,  in the case of spaces it  is  correct not to distinguish between
something fixed and something variable: spaces have no banks, while streams do have
banks and stream-beds, they are defined by something that does not change – or at least
that does not change as rapidly as its content. In passing from MS 165 to MS 129, which
has the character of a more definite work, this reference to the continuity of spaces is
eliminated and the accusation is mitigated (there are no “mistakes” anymore), but, again,
Wittgenstein underlines the fact that James calls thought a “stream,” in spite of his not
distinguishing a priori  and a posteriori.  In other words,  given his characterization of
thought, James should not have used the picture of a stream; conversely, if this can be
said to be a good image of thought, then James’ description of thought is fallacious.
18 The topic of the distinction between what is empirical (experiential, phenomenal) and
what is grammatical (conceptual, logical) is extensively treated Wittgenstein’s lectures of
the post-war years and in RPP, besides constituting one of the main themes of OC. In
Jackson’s notes of the lectures we can read, for example:
Now consider the suggestion: You’ve already thought the meaning before you speak
(James). Is this a psychological statement? If so, how many men does it apply to? Or
does it  apply each time? If  it’s  a psychological statement it’s  an hypothesis:  but
James wishes to say something essential about thinking.31
19 Where is, then, the problem with James’ stream: in the description of thought, or in the
image? Evidently, for Wittgenstein, in the description. Indeed, it is exactly the image of
the  stream  that  Wittgenstein  himself  will  adopt,  a  few  years  later,  in  his  own
characterization of thought. If read in this light, propositions 95 to 99 of OC not only give
a metaphorical description of thought and of the relation between the Weltbild (picture of
the world) and thought;  but also constitute an implicit  critique of James’  use of that
metaphor. Or, better said, they contribute to an implicit praise of James’ image, and an
implicit critique of James’ interpretation of his image:
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95.  The  propositions  describing  this  world-picture  might  be  part  of  a  kind  of
mythology.  And their  role is  like that of  rules of  a  game; and the game can be
learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.
96.  It  might  be  imagined  that  some  propositions,  of  the  form  of  empirical
propositions,  were  hardened  and  functioned  as  channels  for  such  empirical
propositions as were not hardened but fluid;  and that this relation altered with
time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts
may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed
and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from
the other.
98. But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be
wrong.  Yet  this  is  right:  the  same  proposition  may  get  treated  at  one  time  as
something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration
or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in
another gets washed away, or deposited.
20 Wittgenstein is here describing the difference and the relation between the propositions
of the world-picture and empirical propositions. The former are those which allow the
latter to work. Any empirical proposition is grounded in the common sense certainties
which shape our Weltbild, the way we see the world, the way we are minded, the picture
or the “mythology” which, so to speak, keeps everything together. Even when they look
like empirical propositions32 – “Here is one hand” is the classical example 33 – Weltbild
propositions are different in kind; it is meaningless to ask whether they are true or false,
as they form the background against which truth and falsity themselves are defined. They
are the hinges that must stay put, in order for the door to move.
21 The literature on Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions is vast and constantly increasing. For
its clarity and conciseness, it is useful to cite Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s comment (2007:
72), according to which hinge propositions are:
- indubitable: doubt and mistake are logically meaningless;
- foundational: they do not result from justification;
- nonempirical: they are not derived from the senses;
- grammatical: they are rules of grammar;
- ineffable: they cannot be said; 
- in action: they can only show themselves in what we say and do.
22 Hinges,  says Moyal-Sharrock, even when they have an apparent propositional nature,
constitute  non-propositional  certainties,  and  are  akinto  instincts,  ways  of  acting,
attitudes.  Logic itself,  since it  is  hinged on these certainties,  belongs to the reign of
instinct and not to that of reason, and Wittgenstein could be considered the supporter of
a logical pragmatism which asserts the enacted nature of hinge certainties.34
23 Logical propositions are not about facts in the world (notice how near this sounds to the
Tractatus). They work on the level of rules and normativity; it is the level of certainty,
which is categorically distinct from that of knowledge.35 Common sense propositions like
the Moorean “Here is one hand” or “The earth existed for a long time before my birth,”
except  when they are said in peculiar  contexts  and circumstances,  do not  express  a
genuine knowledge. In Moore’s (and James’)36 opinion, we know these propositions for
certain, even if we cannot prove them or give a ground for them. Wittgenstein denies that
we have an epistemic relation with what these propositions assert. The reason why we
cannot give a ground for these sorts of belief, is that the certainty which characterizes
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them is itself a ground, and it shows itself in the ordinary “going without saying” of these
certainties.  In  everyday  contexts,  hinges  work  tacitly,  they  do  not  require  to  be
formulated;  according  to  Moyal-Sharrock  (2007:  94  ff.),  they  even  require  not to  be
formulated, not to be said, because once said they would not go without saying. As Coliva
(2010:  151,  177)  partially  corrects,  the  only  possibility  for  a  hinge  proposition to  be
meaningfully uttered, is when it is used not in a descriptive but in a communicative and/
or normative manner.
24 In Wittgenstein’s metaphor, there is not a sharp division between the movements of the
waters in the river-bed and the movement of the river-bed itself; moreover, the banks of
the  river  are  stratified,  consisting  partly  of  rock,  partly  of  sand.  This  is  not  to  be
interpreted as meaning that, at bottom, no distinction can be made.37 The distinction is at
the same time categorical and not sharp, because one and the same proposition can work
now as empirical and now as logical, but never as both. The shift from one to the other
uses may sometimes be due to slow changes in the Weltbild, as it is clear for example in
the case of Wittgenstein’s own certainty that man has never gone and never will be able
to go to the moon.38 But the change of the Weltbild (river-bed) does not occur at the same
empirical level as the change of what the Weltbild frames (waters).
25 Although Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in OC is primarily Moore, this is evidently the same
kind  of  objection  that  in  the  Manuscript  notes  he  addressed  to  James.  Besides,
Wittgenstein’s  discussion  of  the  Weltbild is  particularly  significant  in  the  context  of
psychological concepts and propositions, the “objectivity” of which, as Egidi (1995: 176)
puts it, “is not achieved by reference to objects, of both internal and external nature, but
depends on whether those sentences obey the system of rules of which they are part,”
which, in turn, imply a complex of “pragmatic criteria of significance.” Wittgenstein’s
discussion of psychology in his later years, then, in its connection to the theme of the
Weltbild and to the distinction between grammatical and empirical, can be read also as an
implicit critique of his phenomenological years and of the jamesian strand which can be
identified in his attempts to catch the flux of experiences. This is another reason which
contributes to the plausibility of reading the image of the river-bed as a sort of correction
of James’ image of the stream.
 
3. Is Wittgenstein’s Critique Justified?
26 In order to ascertain whether Wittgenstein’s critique of James is justified, we now need to
turn  to  the  PP.  In  the  chapter  on  the  stream of  thought,  James,  as  is  well-known,
characterizes it through five features (PP: I, 225):
- Every thought tends to be a part of a personal consciousness; 
- Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing;
- Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous;
- It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself;
-  It  is  interested in  some parts  of  these objects  to  the exclusion of  others,  and
welcomes or rejects all the while.
27 It is in particular in the second and third characters, change and continuity, that James’
stream differs from Wittgenstein’s. Change is what may suggest, if ever, the comparison
between his stream and Heraclitus’ river, and indeed James is reminiscent of Heraclitus
when he writes that “no state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was
before” (PP: I, 230), that “there is no proof that the same bodily sensation is ever got by us
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twice” (231), and of course when he affirms that “of the river of elementary feeling, it
would certainly be true to say, like Heraclitus, that we never descend twice in the same
river” (233). Wittgenstein, on the other hand, remarked that “The man who said that one
cannot step twice into the same river, uttered a falsehood. One can step twice into the
same  river,”  while  explaining  that  “what  we  do  is  to  bring  words  back  from  their
metaphysical  to  their  normal  use  in  language”39 (both  Wittgenstein  and  James  are
referring to a fragment of Heraclitus which is probably spurious, though since Plato on it
is widely accepted as the most famous expression of Heraclitus philosophy).40 It is then by
an appeal to the “rough ground” (PI: § 107) of ordinary language that the metaphysics
implicit in the Heraclitean river is neutralized.
28 With regard to  the feature of  continuity,  James,  often compared to  Henri  Bergson,41
defines the continuous as “that which is without breach, crack or division” (PP: I, 237),
and it  is  in  these pages  that  he proposes  to  define consciousness  as  a  stream (239).
Opposing the traditional psychologists and their empiricist background, James explains
that the image of the stream must convey not only the idea of pails or pots of water, but
also the fact that “even were the pail and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still
between them the free water would continue to flow,” because every image in the mind
“is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it” (255). By acknowledging this,
the vagueness that intrinsically characterizes our mental life can be re-instated in its
proper place (254). To describe this intrinsic vagueness – which, as Fairbanks (1966: 335
ff.)  noted,  is  a very relevant aspect in Wittgenstein too – James (258)  introduces the
concept of the fringe, synonyms of which are psychic overtone and suffusion;42 images or
ideas in the mind do not possess definite contours, but fringed contours, they slowly pass
into each other with continuity,  and this  is  due,  physiologically,  to the “faint  brain-
process” that makes us aware of relations and objects only dimly perceived. The examples
and  explanations  that  James  uses  in  these  pages  are,  as  Wittgenstein  underlines  in
MS 165, to be connected more easily with spaces than with a stream. Indeed, he speaks for
instance about the relation between a thunderclap and the silence which precedes and
follows it (240); he compares the life of thought to the flight of a bird with its resting
places and places of flight (243); he mentions Zeno’s image of the arrow (244); he writes of
an “immense horizon” in which “the present image shoots its perspective before us”
(256) and of a “halo” that surrounds words and sentences (276). This spatial depiction
provides an immediate grasp of the key concept of the continuum, that James will later
(in RE) characterize as pure experience. We shall soon return on this aspect, which, as
Calcaterra (2010: 207) points out, is strictly connected to James’ (and more generally to
the pragmatists’) anti-dichotomic claims.
29 It must be noticed that James does not use the image of the stream without the awareness
of its implications: besides continuity and change, there are also other characteristics
which he is interested in highlighting and which this metaphor illustrates with clarity.
For example, when discussing attention and effort (I: 451-2) he again turns to his image:
The  stream  of  our  thought  is  like  a  river.  On  the  whole  easy  simple  flowing
predominates in it,  the drift  of  things is  with the pull  of  gravity,  and effortless
attention is the rule. But at intervals an obstruction, a set-back, a log-jam occurs,
stops the current, creates an eddy, and makes things temporarily move the other
way. If a real river could feel, it would feel these eddies and set-backs as places of
effort.
30 We may wonder why he did not consider banks and stream-beds as equally relevant
features, besides currents and eddies. Is it that he simply did not see the role of the banks,
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that is, the role of logic? This would be a hasty conclusion. In fact, in other parts of the PP
we can find the description of some elements that, in a sense, force the stream to flow in a
certain direction or according to certain rules.
31 The first connection that it is possible to make is with the chapter on habit, in which the
metaphor of a flow of water is used more than once to give account of what happens in
the brain,  where,  due to the plasticity of  the nervous tissue,  some “currents” shape,
through time, paths or channels.43 Here, if there is a distinction between brain-matter
and what flows through it, James also remarks that what seems fixed is not unchangeable.
Paths in the brain can be reshaped, and indeed a relevant part of the chapter is dedicated
to the importance of education and training in choosing, strengthen and, in some cases,
change the paths. Hence, if there is a distinction between river-beds and waters, change is
not the crucial element that discriminates between the two.
32 To find out something more about this distinction we can turn to the last chapter of the
PP, “Necessary truths and the effects of experience.” Here we are not dealing with
behavioural habits or instincts, but with thought and its laws; nevertheless, again, James’
account has to do with the conformation of  the brain.  The question from which his
argument starts,  is whether necessary truths, due (as “universally admitted”)44 to the
organic  structure  of  the  mind,  are  explicable  by  experience  or  not.  In  the  diatribe
between empiricists, who affirm that they are, and apriorists, who affirm that they are
not, James defends the apriorists’ side, but tries at the same time to give a naturalistic
explanation of the cause of these necessary truths. While a single judgment such as that
fire burns and water makes wet, or knowledge of time and space relations, may be caused
by objects with which we become acquainted, the categories for knowing and judging
need  to  be  explained  differently  (PP:  II,  632).  It  is  the  Darwinian  mechanism  of
spontaneous  variations  in  the  brain  that  James  is  thinking  of,  attributing  to  it  the
responsibility of all  the kinds of ideal and inward relations among the objects of our
thoughts which cannot be interpreted as reproductions of the order of outer experience.
Scientific conceptions, aesthetic and ethical systems are due to this category, as well as
pure sciences of classification, logic and mathematics, all of which are the result of the
fundamental operation of comparison. Comparison “is one of the house-born portions of
our mental structure; therefore the pure sciences form a body of propositions with whose
genesis experience has nothing to do” (626-7). James connects this theme with that of
meaning (a connection which may resemble Wittgenstein’s insistence on the difference
between the conceptual and the phenomenical), where he, for example, insists that we
know the difference between black and white without needing to consult experience: “
What I mean by black differs from what I mean by white,” and again “what we mean by one
plus one is two” because “we are masters of our meanings.” 45 Propositions expressing
time and space relations – summarizes James (644) – are empirical propositions, those
expressing the results of comparison are rational propositions. Yet, why is it that rational
propositions turn out to be in agreement with the empirical world? Why is it that the
straight line is effectively, every time we need to go from A to B in the real world, the
shortest way to connect the two points? “Luckily enough” (658), James answers, we find
that the space of our experience is in harmony with our rational suppositions. But we
must always remember that necessary truths are ideal relations and that they do not
reveal how things really are in the empirical world: they always have to be verified. As he
explains in relation to Locke’s conception, with which he seems to agree in this respect,
such ideas “stand waiting in the mind, forming a beautiful ideal network; and the most
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we can say is that we hope to discover outer realities over which the network may be flung
so that ideal and real may coincide” (665).
33 We might conclude that in James’ text there is a precise and clear distinction between
empirical and logical levels. Are we to deduce that Wittgenstein’s critique is not justified?
Things  are  not  as  simple  as  they  appear  to  be.  As  Myers  (1986:  282)  points  out,  in
distinguishing necessary truths from empirical facts, James did not mean to abandon a
naturalistic conception of science and of psychology as a science. Besides, these ideas are
necessarily  true  merely  in  a  formal  sense:  it  is  only  when  they  are  confirmed  by
experience that they can be said to be true in the proper sense; they should be regarded,
then,  as  “empirical  hypotheses.”46 The primacy of  the scientific  point  of  view is  not
dismissed, and the distinction between necessary truths and the effects of experience is
made within the scientific, naturalistic framework.47
34 This is not a framework that Wittgenstein could share. In an even more pregnant sense,
Wittgenstein’s critique of the confusion between the grammatical and the empirical can
be read as a critique of the confusion between philosophy and science.
 
4. Philosophy and Science
35 It  is  probably also (if  not only)48 against James’  scientific attitude that Wittgenstein’s
numerous  remarks  about  the  importance,  in  philosophy,  to  refuse  explanation  and
embrace  description,  are  directed.  Indeed,  in  Manuscripts  130  and  131  (1946,  partly
published in RPP), which contain a large amount of notes about James’ psychology and
related  themes,  Wittgenstein  repeatedly  argues  against  causal  explanations  and
hypotheses and in favour of description of linguistic games.49
36 Yet some clarification is  needed,  in order to gain a more accurate account of  James’
position.  That  James,  at  least  at  the  beginning  of  his  career,  meant  psychology  as
scientific, there can be no doubt. As early as 1867, in a letter to his father, he wrote that
what he was thinking about, as his object of study, was “the border ground of physiology
and psychology, overlapping both.”50 In the opening of the PP (I: 5) he clearly affirms that
“the psychologist is forced to be something of a nerve-physiologist” and that he has “kept
close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book” (Preface: v). But this
confidence in science and in the possibility of a scientific psychology later vacillates, and
in the Epilogue of the BC, written only two years after the publication of the PP, he
confesses that “the natural-science assumptions with which we started are provisional
and revisable things” (401), that metaphysics is inevitable because “the only possible path
to understand [the relations of the known and the knower] lies through metaphysical
subtlety” (399); and, eventually, that “this is no science, it is only the hope of a science.”
These very words testify, in a sense, that the perspective has not changed: the idea of
making psychology a science is still there, though only as a “hope.” In the same year
(1982), in fact, replying to George T. Ladd’s critical review of the PP, he remarked that
psychology, in order to be scientific,  had to be kept separate from metaphysics51 and
defended the explanatory point of view. As Perry (1935: II, 119) puts it, “this controversy
establishes  beyond any doubt  the fact  that  James was  looking for  a  psychology that
explained,” and particularly that explained scientifically the connections between mind
and body.
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37 On the other hand, the impossibility of keeping philosophy and science independent from
one another  is  clear  to  James,  and this  is  an  aspect  of  the  breadth  and depth  that
distinguishes his approach: 
The popular  notion  that  ‘Science’  is  forced  on  the  mind ab  extra,  and  that  our
interests have nothing to do with its constructions, is utterly absurd. The craving to
believe that the things of the world belong to kinds which are related by inward
rationality together, is the parent of Science as well as of sentimental philosophy;
and the original investigator always preserves a healthy sense of how plastic the
materials are in his hands.52
38 James did not put science on a pedestal, on the contrary, he often relativized its power
and its claims in respects to other modes of knowledge. This attitude parallels his way of
conceiving rationality: reason is not separate from feeling,53 it springs from feeling, and
again  the  continuum  that  characterizes  human  nature  supports  an anti-dichotomic
stance.  James’  aim,  then,  can  be  better  described  as  that  of  keeping  science  and
philosophy distinct,  but not separate.  It  is  this commitment that allows him to hold a
naturalistic viewpoint, and at the same time to give space to philosophy and metaphysics,
in a fallibilistic and anti-dogmatic spirit54 that Wittgenstein probably failed to see.
39 Goodman  (2002:  71)  affirms  that  the  later  Wittgenstein,  too,  was  moving  in  James’
empiricist  direction,  in recognizing the contingency of  language and in stressing the
importance  of  human natural  history,55 but  that  at  the  same time he  preserved the
distinction  between  concepts  and  experiences,  which  James  did  not.  Actually,
Wittgenstein’s alleged empiricism is not so self-evident, particularly in his later writings.
Sometimes  he  had  his  doubts  about  natural  history  itself,  and  sometimes  he  even
explicitly stated that he did not mean to do natural history. 56 What is clear, is that he
retained James’ defense of the contiguity between science and philosophy as heralding
conceptual confusion, and James as unconsciously struggling with metaphysics:
Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about
metaphysics: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is
not  clear  to  it.  A  metaphysical  question  is  always  in  appearance  a  factual  one,
although the problem is a conceptual one.57
40 How needed is the work of philosophy is shown by James’ psychology. Psychology, he
says, is a science, but he discusses almost no scientific questions. His movements, are
merely (so many)  attempts to extricate  himself  from the cobwebs of  metaphysics  in
which he is caught. He cannot yet walk, or fly at all, he only wiggles [this sentence is in
English in the original text]. Not that that isn’t interesting. Only, it is not a scientific
activity.58
41 Yet James was not so unaware of the metaphysical side of his work, and was not so far
from  a  wittgensteinian  perspective  when  he  affirmed  that  “rightly  understood,
[metaphysics] means only the search for clearness where common people do not even
suspect that there is any lack of it.”59 Moreover, he generally considered metaphysics as a
vision of the world or a set of beliefs, which could and should be deliberately chosen,
primarily because of their practical and ethical consequences.60 A complete account of the
two philosophers’  conceptions of  metaphysics  is,  of  course,  beyond the scope of  this
paper. It is nonetheless apparent that the different meaning and value that they assign to
metaphysics is one of the reasons why it is difficult to compare their attitudes towards
the relation between the empirical and the conceptual, science and philosophy.
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42 One last remark on this topic is suggested by the phenomenological readings of the PP,61
which often underline James’ progressive awareness of the weakness of science and his
deepening the metaphysical side of the inquiry. Wilshire (1968: 16) particularly focuses on
how James’ early project is wrecked because the scientific side of his researches is partly
overwhelmed by a sort of protophenomenology; but James’ desire to remain faithful to
his  naturalistic  project  prevents  him  from  fully  developing  his  phenomenological
investigations (202). Now, we may ask, would phenomenology – or radical empiricism –
meet  Wittgenstein’s  demands?  This  is  doubtful.  It  is  indeed  in  the  overcoming  of
phenomenology, that Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar takes shape in the Thirties,62
and this step is never disowned in later years.
43 The point,  which can only be roughly sketched here,  is  that  the task of  philosophy,
according to Wittgenstein, is somehow indirect. By describing linguistic games, it guides
our attention towards the background that sustains them. The method of perspicuous
presentation allows us to perceive the surroundings which define our linguistic practices
and the form of life within which they take place. It is here that we reach the bedrock
where “the spade is turned,”63 the subtle but always existing border between rules and
moves of the game, or, to get back to our metaphor, the banks and the river-bed of our
thoughts. To show these limits, in Wittgenstein’s perspective, is no task for any sort of
science, nor for any philosophical system as traditionally conceived.
 
Conclusion
44 Our  aim  was to  show  the  possibility  of  comparing  James’  stream  of  thought  and
Wittgenstein’s river-bed of thoughts and to read the latter as an implicit comment on the
former. The analysis of some notes belonging to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass has proven that
there can be an effective connection between the two images. Wittgenstein’s river in an
implicit critique of James’ stream, and at the same time an insightful interpretation of the
virtues  of  that  image,  which  James  himself  did  not  see.  This  is  an  example  of
Wittgenstein’s general attitude towards James: he considered some of his intuitions as
brilliant, but in the main could not agree with him on the explicit formulation of his
ideas. Our inquiry has led us to deepen the analysis of James’ characterization of the
stream of thought and this, in turn, has widened our investigation to the topic of the
relation between science and philosophy. Wittgenstein held that James, in his attempts to
be scientific, often lost sight of the richness of his philosophical remarks, and confused
the two levels. The metaphor of the river-bed of thoughts, then, in its insistence on the
distinction between what is  empirical  and what is  logical,  also constitutes a warning
against  the confusion between science and philosophy.  James’  own treatment of  this
matter is, we have argued, more complex than what it appeared to Wittgenstein’s eyes.
The  latter  fails  to  acknowledge  the  density  and  the  ethical  implications  of  James’
approach. Yet, Wittgenstein hits the mark in his underlying that James’ characterization
of the stream of thought lacks a conceptual vision of the relation between thought and its
rules, and of the embeddedness of these rules in the wider context of our form of life with
its linguistic practices. A fully pragmatist stance, one could say; save for Wittgenstein’s
negative attitude towards science, which marks the distance with respects not only to
James,64 but, probably, to pragmatism in general. In any case, this is a topic for a much
wider analysis, for which this paper can constitute only a hint.
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NOTES
1. Wittgenstein (1974: 10, 82).
2. Wittgenstein (1981: 121).
3. Hereafter,  I  will  mention  James’  and  Wittgenstein’s  major  works  by  initials;  see  the
bibliography for details.
4. Goodman (2002: 17).
5. Monk (1991: 477).
6. Wittgenstein 1988.
7. Ter Hark (2004: 131, 137), Goodman (2002: 113), Schulte 1995.
8. Passmore (1966: 434), Fairbanks 1966, Wertz 1972.
9. Particularly in Hacker (1990: ch. 2), Hacker (1996: ch. 4, 5, 6); cf. also Hilmy (1987: ch. 4, 6) and
Gale (1999: 165).
10. Hacker (1990: 305).
11. Nubiola 2000, Goodman (2002: 63 ff.), Jackman 2004.
12. Wittgenstein (1981: 121).
13. Steiner 2012 is an interesting exception.
14. PR: §§ 52-5, 88, 213.
15. RPP: II, §§ 415, 504; PI: part II, 184.
16. Cf. also Boncompagni (2012a: 47, 154).
17. I’m citing 165 before 129 because 165 precedes 129 chronologically.
18. BEE, Items 114, 212, 302.
19. BEE, Item 176.
20. Hacker (1996: 476) affirms that Wittgenstein comments on James’ conception of the stream of
thought only in Manuscripts 124 and 129, and that in both cases he accuses him of conflating a
priori and a posteriori; as we shall see, there are a few more occasions in which James’ stream is
cited and a more complete analysis can show that it  was not only with a critical eye that he
looked at this image.
21. “Ist der Gedankenstrom unterbrochen, so können wir nur vermuten, wie er weitergelaufen
wäre” (BEE: Item 120, 97r). I transcribe the original German version only for those parts of the
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manuscripts which strictly relate to the stream of thought. Translations from the Nachlass are
mine, unless differently specified. 
22. “Hier  könnte  vom  Gedankenstrom,  von  dem  James  redet,  gesprochen  werden  und  man
könnte  darauf  hinweisen  daß,  so  wie  einmir  wohlbekannter  Name  genannt  wird,  meine
Gedanken sich gleich in eine Reihe von Kanäle ergießen und in ihnen weiterlaufen und daß die
Bedeutung des Namens sich in diesen Strömen offenbart” (BEE: Item 124, 235).
23. “Ich erwarte zwei Leute A und B. Ich sage: “Wenn er doch nur käme!” Jemand fragt mich.
“Wen meist Du?” Ich sage, “Ich habe an den A gedacht.” Und diese Worte selber haben eine
Brücke hergestellt. Oder er fragt “Wen meinst Du” und ich antworte: “Ich habe an… gedacht,” ein
Gedicht in dem dieser Satz vorkommt. Die Verbindungen dessen was ich sage mache ich im Laufe
meiner Gedanken und Handlungen. (Diese Betrachtung hängt mit dem zusammen was W. James
“the stream of thought nennt.” Den Fehler in seiner Darstellung ist daß a priori und a posteriori
grammatisches und erfahrungsgemäßes durcheinander nicht unterschieden werden So redet er
von der Kontinuität des Gedankestroms und vergleicht sie mit der des Raums, nicht mit der eines
Wasserstrahles etwa.)” (BEE, Item 165: 24-5).
24. “(Ich glaube,  diese Betrachtung hängt mit  dem zusammen, was W. James “the stream of
thought”  nennt.  Wenn  er  freilich  auch  a  priori  und  a  posteriori,  Erfahrungssätze  und
grammatische, nicht unterschiedet)” (BEE: Item 129, 107).
25. “Man könnte sagen: Ich hätte keinen Eindruck von dem Zimmer als ganzes, könnte ich nicht
meinen Blick schnell  in ihm dahin und dorthin schweifen lassen und mich nicht frei  in ihm
herumbewegen. (Stream of thought) James” (BEE, Item 129: 114).
26. Goodman (2002: ch. 5).
27. Goodman (2002: 106), Gale (1999: 165).
28. Boncompagni (2012a: 106).
29. RPP: II, § 504; Steiner 2012. James will also speak of the flux of life in subsequent writings (see
for example RE: 93). The context is evidently different, but there are also some similarities. On
the  continuity  of  James’  thought  between  the  two  works,  see  Crosby  &  Viney  1992;  on  the
discontinuity, Myers (1986: 78-80).
30. This paragraph, if read together with James’ characterization of psychology in the Epilogue of
the  BC,  really  sounds  like  a  comment  on  James’  words.  Wittgenstein  indeed  says  that  “the
confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young science’; its
state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance in its beginnings” (PI: part II, 197); and
James had written that “at present psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo and
the laws of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the notion that mass is preserved in all
reactions” (BC: 401).
31. Wittgenstein (1988: 245; see also 92 and 205; and RPP: I, §§ 46, 173, 549; II §§ 214, 264, 321).
32. “I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is
one”: OC § 308 (emphasis in the original). Cf. also §§ 136, 319, 321, 401-2, 494, 569.
33. In Moore 1959b, originally published in 1939. Cf. OC: § 1. Wittgenstein’s remarks also refer to
Moore 1959a, originally published in 1925.
34. Moyal-Sharrock 2003.
35. In this distinction Stroll (1994: ch. 9) grounds what he calls Wittgenstein’s “heterogonous
foundationalism”: certainty can constitute a foundation for knowledge because it is not part of
knowledge.
36. James’  account  of  common sense  (P:  Lecture  V),  though presenting  some affinities  with
Wittgenstein’s approach, is much more similar to Moore’s, particularly in considering common
sense as a set of pieces of knowledge. Cf. Boncompagni 2012b.
37. Cf. Perissinotto (1991: 173 ff.).
38. There are many remarks on this in OC, the most striking of which is § 286.
Streams and River-Beds
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
16
39. BEE:  Item  110,  34;  see  also  pp.  39  and  155,  and  Items  116:  226;  120:  50v;  142:  116.  The
proposition about metaphysics appears also in PI: I, § 116.
40. Interestingly, the previous formulation of James’ remark, contained in James (1884), is more
attuned with what critics consider the “true” Heraclitus, who spoke about a river which remains
the same with water which flows and changes; James (1884: 11) indeed stated that “of the mental
river the saying of Herakleitos is probably literally true: we never bath twice in the same water
there.”  On  the  interpretations  of  Heraclitus  and  the  connected  images  of  the  river  in
Wittgenstein, see Shiner 1974 and Stern 1991. Unfortunately none of the two acknowledges the
importance that James’ image may have had on Wittgenstein’s account.
41. Passmore (1966: 105 ff.). On the relation between the two thinkers see Perry (1935: II, ch.
LXXXVI).
42. Cf. Bailey (1999: 145).
43. PP: I, 106, 107, 113.
44. PP: II, 617.
45. Respectively p. 644 and 655 (emphasis in the original).  On James’ different conceptions of
meaning in the PP and in other writings, cf. Myers (1986: 285).
46. Crosby & Viney (1992: 111).
47. For a non naturalistic account, see Flanagan 1997.
48. Hilmy (1987: 207).
49. BEE: Item 130, 35, 71-2 (RPP: I, 46), 218; Item 131, 56 (RPP: I, 257).
50. Perry (1935: I, 254).
51. Giorgi (1990: 69 ff.).
52. PP: II, 667.
53. Cf. The Sentiment of Rationality, in James (1897: ch. 3).
54. Calcaterra (2008: 94 ff.).
55. PI: part I, § 415.
56. RPP: I, § 46; PI: part II, § XII; RC: part III, § 9.
57. RPP: I, § 949 (originally in MS 134: 153).
58. This remarks comes from the same Manuscript 165 (p. 150-1) in which is our first “stream
with no banks” occurrence. I am using, here, Hilmly’s (1987: 196-7) translation.
59. In a letter dated 1888 to the positivist psychologist Ribot, cited in Edie (1987: ix) and in Perry
(1958: 58).
60. For example in James (1897: ch. 1).
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ABSTRACTS
The influence of William James on Ludwig Wittgenstein has been widely studied, as well as the
criticism that the latter addresses to the former, but one aspect that has only rarely been focused
on is the two philosophers’ use of the image of the flux, stream, or river. The analysis of some
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notes  belonging  to  Wittgenstein’s  Nachlass support  the  possibility  of  a  comparison  between
James’ stream of thought, as outlined in the Principles of Psychology, and Wittgenstein’s river-bed
of thoughts, presented in On Certainty. After an introduction which offers a general frame for the
following work,  the first  section of  the paper examines  all  the Nachlass entries  that  directly
mention  James’  stream.  Section 2  focuses  on  two  remarks  in  which  Wittgenstein  explicitly
criticizes  James’  concept  and implicitly  anticipates  his  own way of  dealing with this  matter.
These remarks, belonging to Manuscripts 165 and 129, both dating 1944, have not been published
in any of Wittgenstein’s edited books, nor is it possible to find the same argument elsewhere.
Wittgenstein’s critique concerns James’ lack of distinction between what is grammatical,  or a
priori, and what is empirical, or a posteriori, a distinction which the image of the stream should
have suggested: a stream flows in a stream-bed and within banks. This is exactly the meaning
that Wittgenstein’s own metaphor of the river-bed of thoughts is intended to convey. Section 3
analyses  James’  concept  of  the  stream  and  its  corollaries,  in  order  to  clarify  whether
Wittgenstein’s critique is justified or not. James in effect draws a separation between a priori and
a posteriori, but this separation is conceived from within the framework of empirical science.
This analysis leads to the theme of the relations among science, philosophy and metaphysics,
which is the subject of section 4. The conclusion is that Wittgenstein did appreciate James for his
intuitions and for the power of his imagination: in a sense he even developed them; but he could
not agree on the explicit formulation of his ideas.
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